Venezuela

[kercoz]

Heu, Ramina ,

(aides sociales, armée, hopitaux, écoles, etc).

Un peu comme une famille qui utiliserrait un héritage pour payer les dépenses du quotidien, et qui du coup mangerait du caviar à tous les repas.

, racourci un peu ...rapide , non ?...bon , d'accord , armée est un peut obscène mais autrement?

[papy_russe]

Si on utilise l'héritage pour se préparer aux conséquences du PO, ça peut être un bien.

[Raminagrobis]

Heu, Ramina ,

(aides sociales, armée, hopitaux, écoles, etc).

Un peu comme une famille qui utiliserrait un héritage pour payer les dépenses du quotidien, et qui du coup mangerait du caviar à tous les repas.

, racourci un peu ...rapide , non ?...bon , d'accord , armée est un peut obscène mais autrement?

Ben je veux dire que le pétrole est une recette non reproductible. Comme réaliser un placement, vendre une maison. Le pétrole qu'on produit maintenant il ne sera plus là pour la génération suivante.
Il ne devrait donc servir que d'une façon utile aux générations suivantes (faire des infrastures pour le long terme, préparer l'après PO comme dit papy russe, solder des dettes, constituer des réserves d'or...).
S'en servir pour payer le budget courant de l'état, c'est aller dans le mur.

En plus la production du venezuela est depuis longtemps en déclin. Et la consommation intérieure augmente. Baisse des exportations + chute du prix = budget plombé.

[kercoz]

S'en servir pour payer le budget courant de l'état, c'est aller dans le mur.

J'avais pas compris ça comme ça.
Répartir le bénéfices d'une manne sur la populace me parait plus sain que la reserver a qqs uns , ce qui de toutes les façons se serait fait. Je crois meme qu'une partie des unes auraient pris la direction des zuniens.
Maintenant la critique de non économie d'un bien qui devient rare est pertinente , mais faudrait pas la faire sur un des seul pays qui redistribue l'obscénité a tout le monde.
Il est évident qu'on devrait deja fermer les usines a bagnoles et monter les prix de l'energie.

[energy_isere]

La compagnie nationale du Venezuela PDVSA veut lancer un énorme programme d' investissement dans le Gaz offshore d'un montant de 19.6 milliard de $.
Un train de liquéfaction du Gaz est prévu.
Participation de PDVSA à hauteur de 60%, le reste avec des compagnies étrangéres.

Venezuela launches multi-billion-dollar gas project

2 days ago

CARACAS (AFP)

Venezuela's state-owned Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) announced it had set up a joint venture with Argentinean, Portuguese, US and Japanese firms to tap offshore natural gas fields.

The venture will develop an estimated 28.8 trillion cubic feet of known natural gas reserves in the off-shore Deltana platform and Paria Gulf, with marketing plans targeted to begin in 2014.

The 19.65 billion dollar project includes building two trains, or production units, for liquefied natural gas (LNG), each with a projected annual yield of 4.7 million tonnes, as well as offshore extraction and pumping facilities.

The mixed-capital joint venture brings together Venezuela's PDVSA, Portugal's Galp Energia, US Chevron and Global Technology Services, Argentina's Energia Argentina and Japan's Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsui and Itochu Corporation.

PDVSA will have a 60 percent stake in the joint venture, the company said in a statement.

"We have all the companies' commitment to maintain the project, to make investments for the development of basic engineering, that we hope will be completed in 2009, for a total of 200 million dollars," said Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez in the statement.

PDVSA vice president for exploration and production Eulogio del Pino said the initiative shows the "trust" placed in Venezuela, adding that it will "supply gas throughout the Caribbean, South America and premium markets in Europe and Southeast Asia."

The joint venture will be tasked with designing, building and operating the LNG trains, as well as the gas pipelines that will feed factories in the industrial complex Gran Mariscal de Ayacucho, at Guira, in the northeastern state of Sucre.

The project is part of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's strategy called the "Great National Gas Revolution" that aims to boost the country's natural gas production from 6.3 billion cubic feet per day in 2007, to 11.5 billion by 2012, the statement said.

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/ar ... 08Om5f91OA

[Raminagrobis]

http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/a ... px?id=3175

Gros doutes sur le Venezuela : sa production et des exportations de pétrole seraient bien inférieurs au chiffres officiels, sa solvabilité financière aussi par conséquent...

Qui croire sur les statistiques ?
Les Vénézueliens ont ils quelque chose à gagner à diffuser des chiffres gonfflés ? Oui, clairement, ça donne des faux espoirs sur leurs capacités financières.
Les Américains ont ils à gagner à diffuser des chiffres sous estimés ? Probablement aussi.

Venezuela Oil: Worse Shape

STEEP DECLINE: Venezuela's oil exports have dropped 42 percent since 1997, the author calculates. (Photo: PDVSA)

The Venezuelan economy may be in far worse shape than officially announced, and in a weaker position to face the present sharp fall in oil export revenue.

There is a large discrepancy between Venezuela’s official production figures and the substantially lower production data reported by international agencies. In addition, domestic petroleum consumption has likely been much higher than officially reported. The debate around the production, domestic consumption and export figures is important for at least four reasons.

First, these figures constitute the basis for the assessment of the performance of Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), particularly on how the company has evolved since late 2002-early 2003 strike that brought operations to a halt and in which the government fired half the industry’s labor force.

Second, since crude oil production may be lower and domestic petroleum consumption much higher, petroleum export volumes could be considerably lower than reported, with implications for both oil export revenue and determining which markets are effectively supplied and by how much.

Third, oil export revenue figures are calculated on the basis of the official export volume figures; thus, official oil export revenue estimates may be grossly overestimated. If so, the actual amount of funds available to the government could be just a small percentage of the official reported revenues. Stated differently, the Venezuelan economy may be in far worse shape than officially announced, and in a weaker position to face the present sharp fall in oil export revenue.

Fourth, Venezuela’s exports to markets other than the United States, the Caribbean and Central America are lower than Venezuela’s official figures state. In addition, the latest oil provided by Venezuela under government-to-government agreements was sold at a discount, with payments financed over a 25-year period. As a result, Venezuela has become ever more dependent on its exports to the United States as a source of export cash revenue. The bottom line is that official figures for the last decade may overstate export volumes by as much as 55 percent. PDVSA exports, excluding the strategic associations1, may be overestimated by as much as 75 percent. (…)

FALLING PRODUCTION

According to IEA, crude production in Venezuela has declined to 2.36 million barrels per day (MBD) in 2008, down from 3.18 in 1997. That is a drop of 0.82 MBD or 26 percent. On the other hand, according to official figures, production in 2008 is slightly higher than in 1997, 3.27 vs. 3.16 MBD. The gap between IEA and official figures becomes larger after 2002, with the data diverging widely after the 2002-2003 PDVSA strike. Official figures show production bouncing back to the pre-strike levels after 2003 and remaining there. IEA figures show that production recovers slightly in 2004-2005, but never returns to the pre-strike levels and declines in the years 2006-2008. According to the IEA, total crude oil production in 2008 was as low as in 2003, the year of the strike.

The difference between both sets of data grows ever larger after 2002, to reach a maximum of 0.91 MBD in 2008 — 29 percent of the total amount of oil that Venezuela claims to have produced. (…)

The IEA produces public monthly data for the most important world oil producers, including Venezuela. Venezuela’s official sources, however, do not produce public monthly data. (…)

According to the IEA, PDVSA’s production, excluding that of the strategic associations, never recovered to the pre-strike levels and has declined steadily since then. It declined to 1.82 MBD in December 2008 from 2.35 MBD in June 2003, an average annual decline of 4.8 percent. PDVSA’s production ten and half years ago, in June 1998, was 3.17 MBD. Thus it has declined 43 percent over this period. (…)

It is difficult to believe that after being decimated by the strike, PDVSA was able to recover and sustain its production levels. There is no evidence that the technical expertise and knowledge that the corporation lost has been restored. On the contrary, the remaining PDVSA oil-industry engineers and skilled workers are being stretched thin, as they have had to take responsibility for the production formerly carried out by private companies through operational contracts10 and by the strategic associations. Operational contracts were awarded to private companies to reactivate less profitable marginal fields to expand PDVSA’s operational capacity during the expansion plan throughout the 1990s. The fields operated by private companies were brought under PDVSA’s de facto control as of April 2006.

Furthermore, as mentioned above, PDVSA’s management has been forced to assume an ever increasing number of non-oil related activities, such as the different social programs (misiones) administered directly by PDVSA and the program for the procurement and distribution of food (PDVAL), among others.

On top of all that, the national telecommunications company, CANTV, the regional electricity company, Electricidad de Caracas, expropriated in 2006, and the cement corporations CEMEX, Lafarge, and Holcim, expropriated in 2007, have been managed by PDVSA. All this has been at the expense of PDVSA’s own core responsibilities.

The 2002-2004 gap between the official and the IEA production figures for PDVSA of some 0.4 MBD, or 15 percent of the official figure, increases to 0.92 MBD or 33 percent of the official production figure by 2008.

EXPORTS: WIDER GAP

The gap between estimated and official export figures is even wider than the gap between estimated and official production figures. Official petroleum exports in 2008 are roughly similar to the 1997 figure. But the exports calculated here (annual production according to the IEA minus estimated domestic consumption) decline from 2.95 MBD in 1997 to 1.71 MBD in 2008, a drop of 1.24 MBD or 42 percent.

The official export figures show the same pattern as the production data — the official export figures recover after 2003 to levels above the pre-strike levels. The 2005 and 2006 export figures are higher than in 2001. The 2004 and 2007 export figures are similar to the figure for 2002. Official export volume in 2008 is exactly the same as in 1997.
By contrast, the estimated exports for all four years, 2004-2008, show a decline from 2001 and 2002. Estimated exports drop faster compared to the IEA production figures than the drop in the official figures, due to the sharp increase in estimated domestic consumption compared to official domestic consumption figures. The estimated and official total export figures for the period 1997-2008 are shown in Figure 8.

Until 2000, the difference between the estimated and the official export figures is minor, below 0.2 MBD or 8 percent of the official figure. The gap begins to widen between 2001 and 2003, when it increases more than twofold, up to almost 0.50 MBD or 17 percent the official figure. Between 2004 and 2008 the gap opens wider, increasing twofold again to reach 1.24 MBD or 42 percent the official export figure by 2008.

ESTIMATED VS OFFICIAL EXPORTS

Domestic consumption of oil products is supplied exclusively from PDVSA’s own production. As mentioned earlier, all of the strategic associations’ output is exported. Given the increases in domestic demand, PDVSA’s own exports have fallen more sharply than total exports.
PDVSA’s estimated petroleum exports declined from 2.95 MBD in 1997 to 1.20MBD in 2008, a drop of 1.75 MBD or 60 percent. Official PDVSA petroleum exports have declined from 2.93 MBD down to 2.44 MBD, a drop of 0.49 MBD or 17 percent. PDVSA’s exports declined faster than total exports and have never recovered to pre-strike levels. Estimated and official PDVSA petroleum exports for the period 1997-2008 are shown in Figure 9.

By 2008, the difference between estimated and official PDVSA exports of 1.24 MBD represented 50 percent of the official PDVSA export figure.

ESTIMATED MONTHLY EXPORTS

Using the estimates above, one can also estimate the monthly total exports of crude oil and products. Because domestic consumption of oil products is supplied solely by PDVSA, it is also possible to calculate PDVSA’s own exports separately from those of the strategic associations.
Figure 10 shows total estimated monthly exports and PDVSA’s exports since August 2000, using the IEA’s data on the strategic associations’ production. Estimated total exports at the end of 2008 were 1.69 MBD, and PDVSA’s exports were 1.16 MBD. PDVSA exports declined steadily after the strike, from 1.95 MBD in June 2003 to 1.16 MBD in December 2008, a drop of 0.79 MBD or 41 percent in five years. PDVSA’s own exports have been falling at a rate of 9.5 percent per year as production has declined and domestic consumption has increased. Total exports remain roughly constant up to mid-2005, when the strategic associations came onstream. After 2005 they declined at the same pace as PDVSA’s own exports. (…)

The Venezuelan oil sector experienced a massive loss of knowledge and technical know-how as a consequence of the 2002-2003 strike, when the bulk of the managers, engineers and skilled workers left the company. This loss, together with the diversion of an ever larger amount of financial and human resources away from PDVSA’s core activities, has translated into a sustained drop in production and exports. The magnitude of the damage is such that this trend is irreversible in the medium term if the current institutional arrangements endure.

Ramón Espinasa was chief economist at Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) in Caracas until 1999. Currently, he is a full-time consultant in the energy division of the infrastructure and environment sector at the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) in Washington, D.C. Before joining the IADB, Dr. Espinasa was a full-time consultant in the office of public policy and competitiveness at the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) in Caracas, Venezuela, as well as a consultant at the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD-World Bank) in Washington, D.C. In addition, he has been an adjunct professor at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and professor at the Universidad Católica Ándres Bello in Venezuela.

This column is based on an excerpt of The Performance of the Venezuelan Oil Sector 1997-2008: Official vs. International and Estimated Figures, a policy paper from the Energy Cooperation and Security in the Hemisphere Task Force of the University of Miami’s Center for Hemispheric Policy. Republished with permission of the center.

[energy_isere]

Venezuela : le gouvernement central reprend le contrôle des ports et des aéroports

mercredi 18 mars

Le président vénézuélien, Hugo Chavez, a annoncé dimanche que le gouvernement central reprend l’administration des ports et des aéroports des mains des gouvernements d’Etat.

"Nous allons recontrôler tous les ports et les aéroports de la République, qu’importe si quelqu’un est contre", a indiqué M. Chavez dans son programme à la radio et sur la télévision "Alo presidente", retransmis par des chaînes et des stations officielles.

Cette mesure vise à assurer la sécurité nationale, a expliqué M. Chavez. Il a ordonné au ministre de la Défense, Ramon Carrizalez, et au haut commandant militaire de l’appliquer immédiatement.

La mesure est basée sur une loi révisée dont l’amendement a été approuvé le 11 mars dernier.

Le président a ordonné à l’armée nationale bolivarienne du Venezuela d’occuper la semaine prochaine trois ports contrôlés par des politiciens de l’aile droite.

"Ce sont des infrastructures stratégiques et elles n’appartiennent pas à un quelconque chef de tribu ou de mafia", a martelé M. Chavez.

Sources Xinhua

[energy_isere]

Assurance vie : Le Venezuela offre une base aux bombardiers stratégiques russes

mercredi 18 mars Xinhua

Le président vénézuélien Hugo Chavez a autorisé la Russie à utiliser une base aérienne située sur l’île de La Orchila comme base provisoire pour ses bombardiers stratégiques, rapporte le service de presse Interfax samedi, citant un officier supérieur de l’armée de l’air russe.

"Le président vénézuélien a effectivement fait cette proposition à la Russie. Côté russe, la décision politique est encore à prendre, mais c’est tout à fait envisageable", a commenté Anatoli Zhikhariev, chef d’état-major de l’armée de l’air russe.

Il a précisé avoir visité en 2008 la base aérienne en question, qui fait partie d’une base navale locale, et que quelques travaux de reconstruction seraient nécessaires pour qu’elle puisse accueillir des bombardiers stratégiques russes entièrement chargés.

M. Zhikharev a ajouté que la Russie pourrait également utiliser Cuba comme base pour ses bombardiers stratégiques. "Il existe quatre ou cinq bases aériennes à Cuba avec des pistes de 4.000 mètres, qui nous conviennent parfaitement", a-t-il déclaré.

L’année dernière, la Russie a rétabli ses patrouilles de bombardiers stratégiques dans les régions éloignées, quinze ans après leur suspension suite à l’effondrement de l’ex-Union soviétique.

Deux bombardiers stratégiques Tu-160 russes ont atterri en septembre 2008 sur une base aérienne vénézuélienne, après avoir survolé l’Atlantique et la mer des Caraïbes.

Sources Xinhua

[Alturiak]

Pourquoi "assurance vie" ?
Edit : ok, parce que faute de copier coller (mais pas d'Energy Isère hein !)

[energy_isere]

C' est contreinfo qui juge que l' instauration de base aerienne est une "assurance vie" pour Hugo Chavez.

[Alturiak]

Ah. Ils se réservent le droit de commenter directement les titres d'articles en les modifiant. Bon.

[Krom]

Si on utilise l'héritage pour se préparer aux conséquences du PO, ça peut être un bien.

On utilise l'héritage pour se préparer à l'épuisement de l'héritage?

[Raminagrobis]

lien : ca va très mal pour PdVSA, qui doit 14 milliards de dollars à différentes sociétés de services pétroliers et n'arrive pas à les payer.
La "solution" de chavez consiste à saisir les actifs de 60 de ces compagnies de service, comme ça y'aura plus à les payer.

[energy_isere]

effectivement quand le revenu de PVDSA fond de 120 à 50 milliard de $ et que ca represente la moitié des rentrées de l' état, il y a comme un probléme.

.....The company is accounts for about half of Venezuela’s revenue, and is largely responsible for funding and administering the social programs that Chavez has employed to court popular support.
.PDVSA brought in more than $120 billion in revenue in 2008, but this year, it will likely make just $50 billion......

[akochan]

Ce n'est que le debut de la chute a mon avis. Si on rajoute le nigeria plus la speculation on peut avoir des doutes quand au fait que la production puisse augmenter...
Par contre le prix quand a lui pourrait progresser...!!!